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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 15776

MICHAEL JOSEPH JIMINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appeal by Appellant from his criminal conviction
for Theft by Deception, a second degree felony, in violation
of ·Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
An?ellant was convicted by a jury in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, ane
sentenced by Judge Dean Conder to a term in prison of not
less than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays this Court to affirm the decision
of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts is divided into two varts.
Subsection A states the facts of the offense.

Subsection B

outlines the procedural steps before trial.

A.
Mr. Anthony Escabar, a former professional soccer
player and owner of Alpha Distributing Co., a Salt Lake City
home furnishings distributor, was introduced in June,1976, to
the appellant, Michael Joseph Jiminez

(T. 11), and began

business dealings with.defendant.
The appellant represented to Mr. Escabar:

(1) that

he was Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tri-Delta
Corporation, a large California corporation,

(2) that Tri-

Delta owned Frontier U.S.A., a multi-million dollar corporation
with stock trading at $5.00 per share in the over-the-counter
. market
20~

(T. 18);

(3) that he had millions of dollars of Exxon

Phillips Petroleum

Kimberly-Beers Company;

Co~pany

stock available to

hi~ th~ou~.~

(4) that he owned Zero Cold, a large

restaurant equipment supply corporation doing the major

j
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supplying to such large food chains as Kentucky Fried Chicken,
Wendy's Restaurants, McDonalds, Winchel's Donuts

(Exh. 2,

T. 19), (5) that he owned Harbor Rest Memorial Park in Southern
California;

(6) that he owned White Barns Condominiums in

Ogden, Utah, the Capitol Heights Apartment Building project
behind the State Capitol Building in Salt Lake City, Utah,
and a large shopping center, Continental Bank & Trust, an Idaho
Bank, and Dollar A Day Rent A Car,

(T. 18-21);

(7) that he

could get any amount of money from the Ogden branch of First
Security Bank of Utah, where he already had a number of loans
in excess of several million dollars secured by some of his
stock in his various companies

(T.

21).

That these representations were made, is corroborated
by a brochure from Tri-Delta Corporation given to Mr. Escabar
by the appellant

(Exh. 2, T. 21) and by testimony of other

witnesses including Ogden Attorney Robert V. Phillips

(T. 155-

160).

Based upon these representations of financial success
and the appellant's claimed ability to provide sufficient capital,
o:i

~1_i_ly

1},

-1976, >Ir ..

~scabar

entered into an agree:ri.e:i.t -:.v:...t.h

the appellant to attempt to acquire a soccer franchise and
operate a soccer team in Utah

(T. 23, 31, 39).
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The essential elements of the agreement between
the appellant and Mr. Escabar were that Mr. Escabar would
(1) remain President of his own Alpha Distributing Company,
which would be taken over by appellant's multi-million dollar
Company, Frontier U.S.A;
U.S.A.;

(2) become Vice President of Frontim

(3) receive $20,000.00 cash as a down payment for the

purchase of Alpha Distributing by Frontier, and which would be
used for soccer expenses;

(4) receive Frontier U.S.A. stock

worth $200,000.00, at the going rate of $5.00 per share;
(5) become President of the to-be-acquired soccer team which
would be known as the Utah Pioneers;

(6) receive a car and a

credit line from Tri-Delta Corporation_ (T.26-37,44).
was to:

(1) Pay the $20,000.00 cash to Escabar and

Defendant
(2)

financially support the Utah Pioneers Soccer Team through
T~i-Delta

Corporation and Frontier U.S.A.

(T. 29-32, 74).

Appellant stated that he would give all the profits from the
operation of the soccer team to the LDS Church.

This fact

was stated-again for the press and public at subsequent news
conferences through major Salt Lake City television stations
'--"-J

newspa;:iers (T.40,42).

The defendant had a letter

p __-~;:ia.ced

for Mr. Escabar's use which stated, in relevant part, that:

-4-
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"One. Alpha Distributing is now a
wholly owned subsidiary of Tri-Delta
Corporation. Two. Mr. Anthony Escabar
has been duly appointed by the President
of Tri-Delta and confirmed by the Board
of Directors as a Vice President of TriDel ta and President of Alpha Distributing.
Three. Tri-Delta Corporation will
guarantee and support Alpha Distributing
"
(T. 38, lines 24-30)
The defendant's primary interest in acquiring the
soccer team was publicity

(T. 19, 252).

Following the agreement and negotiations with the
American Soccer League for future payment of the Soccer
Franchise, Escabar was to organize and operate the .soccer
team.

Of the promised $20,000, $10,000 was eventually paid

by appellant by check, but the check bounced
A later check cleared another bank

(T.

(T.

45, 46).

47).

Following this initial check from the appellant,
no more of the promised financial support was provided by the
appellant for the operation of the soccer team and Mr. Escabar
was forced to pay soccer expenses with capital of Alpha
Distributing, expecting reimbursement so Alpha Distributing
1vOl'.h1

r;ot qo

(T. 43).

bo.n~rti_?t

tl:rough loss of operating capital

Mr. Escabar contacted appellant numerous times and

informed him of his cash needs for the operation of the soccer
team

(T. 47).

The appellant promised Mr. Escabar that monies

would be sent, but in the meantime, instructed Mr. Escabar to
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continue paying expenses from the Alpha accounts (T.48).
Mr. Escabar never received any further money from the
appellant for the operation of the soccer team and
was forced to pay all expenses from his own personal
sources or the accounts of Alpha (T.69,74).

In several

cases, soccer players were given merchandise from Alpha
in order to satisfy amounts owed them as salary for
playing (T.168).

At trial, the State produced numerous

checks made by Alpha to cover the costs and expenses
of the Utah Pioneers soccer team (T.50-69).
The State produced evidence that many of appellant's original material representations were false.
Emerson Burgess stated at trial that he was the President
of Zero Cold Corporation during 1976 (T.216).

He testified

that the defendant had offered to buy Zero Cold, but that
the sale never went through (T.224,225).

Fred Jenson

testified that in 1976 he was an officer of a California
bank that owned Harbor Rest Memorial Park (T.107).
stated that th2

defe~dant

cemet:,ry, but never

ca1~e

He

had negotiated to purchase the
up with any money (T.112).

He

testified defendant never owned Harbor Rest.
Keith Downs testified that he was president of
White Barns Condominiums and golf course in Ogden, Utah,

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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in 1976 (T.191).

Downs testified that the defendant

never had any ownership interest in White Barns (T.192).
Burt Elg testified that he was Vice President
and Trust Officer of Continental Bank and Trust (1'.197).
He stated that bank records showed no bank ownership
interests in the name of the defendant, Tri-Delta or
Frontier U.S.A.

(T.198).

John H. Kelly testified that he was secretary
and treasurer of the Capital Heights project in 197?.
(T.200).

Mr. Kelly further testified that neither the

defendant, Tri-Delta or Frontier U.S.A. every possessed
any ownership interest in Capital Heights (T.202).
Conrad

Scheidel! testified that at the time

appellant made representations, Frontier U.S.A. stock
was not being sold over the counter, but that he had sold
two (2) lots at $.62 per share, not $5.00

per share (T.204-207).

In addition to this evidence, Bill Marcroft,
a local television sportscaster, testified that he spoke
with the appell3nt in 1976 at a new3 conference announcinq
the soccer team's formation (T.210).

Mr. Marcroft stated

that when he asked the appellant how much money he was
going to put into the franchise, the defendant told him he

-7-
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would put $21 million into the team (T.211).

The

appellant told Mr. Marcroft that he was a millionaire
and wanted the team for publicity (T.212).
In January of 1977, Escabar made a final

~lea

to defendant for money for his dying company (T.70-73).
He received in return a letter stating that the original
agreement had been rescinded back in August of 1977 (T.
70-73).

However, Escabar had never been notified of

any rescission until January, and Escabar had had
conversations with defendant after August in which the
agreement appeared still to be in force (T.70-73).
Also, Lyle Jenkins, a later manager of Alpha
Distributing, testified that he was instructed by
defendant in October to sell one of the remaining
assets of Alpha Distributing and send the proceeds to
the defendant in California.

A check was produced to show

that the proceeds were sent to defendant (R.168-169).
After the presentation of all the evidence,
the jury founJ the

defenda~t

guilty of theft by deception.

This appeal follows.

B.
The procedural facts of which the Court
should be aware are as follows:
1.

August 3, 1977, an information, signed by

Robert R. Wallace, was filed in Third District Court
ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
(R.Library
7). Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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2.

August 5, 1977, appellant was arraigned

in District Court.

At the arraignment appellant was

represented by H. Ralph Klemm
3.

and Gerald L. Turner (R.8).

August 15, 1977, appellant moved to quash

the information on the grounds that the facts did not
constitute an offense.

The motion was denied and a bill

of particulars was ordered (R.11).
4.

Trial was set for October 19, 1977 (R.8).

5.

October 19, 1977, the trial was continued

to December 12, 1977 (R.15).
6.

November 15, 1977, Mr. Klemm and Mr. Turner

withdrew as counsel (R.16).
7.

December 12, 1977, Randall Gaither appeared

for appellant and moved for a continuance of the trial
based upon the grounds that "defense counsel having
just accepted the case and not being ready for trial at this
time."

Trial was set for March 6, 1978 (R.17).
8.

January 17, 1977 (sic, 1978) Randall Gaither

sent a motion to withdraw as counsel to Robert R. Wallace,
Assistant Attorney General, but did

not file the motion

with the cou=t nor obtain an order for withdrawal (R.46).
A copy of this motion was introduced at a hearing on
appellant's motion to quash before Honorable Judge Ernest
Baldwin, March 1, 1978.

A transcript of this hearing

was not included in the documents forwarded to this Court,
although all documents were designated (R.110).
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9.

February 24, 1978,

RanclcHl

Cailher

f~'e·-'l

a

written notice of appearance of counsel with the court and
a Motion to Quash (R.28,29).
10.

March 1, 1978, a hearing on the Motion to

Quash was held before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin
(R.27).
11.

The motion was denied on the grounds that

the "said motion was not timely filed."
12.

(R.27,27).

March 6-8, 1978, trial was held.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ATTORJ.~EY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF UTAH HAS THE AUTHORITY TO FILE
AND SUBSCRIBE A CRIMINAL INFORMATION
IN A STATE DISTRICT COURT.
The Utah State Constitution, Article VII,
Section 1, provides for the duties of the Attorney
General as follows:
"The executive Department shall
consist of Cove~nor, 3ecret~~y of
St2te, State Auditor, State ~reasurer,
and Attorney General. • • They shall
perform such duties as are prescribed
by this Constitution and as may be
prescribed by law."
(EJT\phasis added.

-10-
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Article VII, Section 18, further provides:
"The Attorney General shall be
the legal adviser of the State
officers, and shall perform such
other duties as may be provided by
law."
(Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann.

§

67-5-1

(1953), as amended, states:

"It is the duty of the Attorney General:
(1)
To attend the Supreme Court of this
state, and all courts of the United States,
and prosecute or defend all causes to
which the state • • • is a party.

*

*

*

*(7)

*

*

(5)
To exercise supervisory powers
over the district and county attorneys of
the state in all matters pertaining' to the
duties of their offices.
When required by the public service
or directed by the governor to assist any
district or county attorney in the discharge
of his duties."
Utah Code Ann.

§

67-5-1 (1953), as amended, was

specifically interpreted in Meyers v. Second Judicial District
Court, 108 Utah 32, 156 P.2d 711 (1945).

In that case the

appellant argued that the Attorney General did not have the
power or right to appear before a grand jury as a prosecutor.
The Court specifically quoted Sections (5) and (7) of the
above mentioned statute and held that the Attorney

Gener~l

did have the authority to appear as a prosecutor before a grand
jury. 1

1

The Court quoted Sacramento County v. Central Pacific

In Meyers, the Court quotes Utah Code Ann. § 87-6-1 (1943),
which has since become Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1 (1953), as
amended; the language of both statutes is identical.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Ry. Co., 61 Cal. 250 (1882), in ruling that:
"The District Attorney had the
power to commence and prosecute the
action, subject to the supervision
of the Attorney General (Pol. Code,
470.)
The last named officer has
power, whenever, in his opinion, the
public 5ervTce-~ire5lt:~-·-as3:cct_ •
the District Attorney.
(Ibid.)
When
he thus assists the District Attorney,
he may, by virtue of his 'supervisory
power over the District Attorneys
in all matters pertaining to the
duties of their offices,' assume a
paramount control and direction
of the business he and the District
Attorney are jointly conducting."
156 P. 2d at 715.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Attorney General has certain enumerated
statutory powers, which have been interpreted to include the
ability to appear before a grand jury as a prosecutor,
Meyers, supra, but all these powers are in addition to those
previously existing under the common law.
The State of Utah has statutorily adopted the
corrunon law of England by way of Utah Code Ann.

§

68-3-1

(1953):
"The COI!lillon law of England so far
as it is not repugnant of, or in confli~t
with, t~e Constitution or l~ws of the
United States, or the Constitution or
laws of this state, and so far only as
it is consistent with and adapted to the
natural and physical conditions of this
state and the necessities of the people
hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be
the rule of decision in all courts of this
state."

-12-by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Although it is not generally the duty of the
Attorney General to conduct criminal trials in lower
courts, he may do so in states where the Attorney General
excrci.;es cor:-lnron la•.·1 pcn·l2rs.
§

9, p. 1234.

7 C.J.S., Attorney General,

Specifically, this power encompasses all

aspects of the prosecution, from filing an information to
the ultimate termination of proceedings.

People v. Karrella,

35 Mich.App. 541, 142 N.W.2d 676 (1971); State v. Daviess
Circuit Court, 236 Ind. 624, 142 N.E.2d 626 (1957}.
In Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177
(1969), the Utah Supreme Court considered the question of
whether the Attorney General has common law powers in a case
where the Attorney General sought to initiate a declaratory
judgment action to determine the constitutionality of certain
legislative amendments.

The Court observed that the states

are split on the issue; noted that the majority favor upholding
such common law power and made a strong argument in favor of
upholding the common law powers of the Attorney General in
Utah.

456 P.2d at 178.
A recent survey by the National Association of

Attorneys General (hereinafter NAAG) reveals that the opinion
of the Utah Court in Hansen is consistent with the position
that is taken in the vast majority of state jurisdictions
which have also held that the Office of the Attorney General

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is vested with the common law powers.

(Page 39, National

Association of Attorneys General, Committee on the Office
of Attorney General, February, 1971.)
tabular summa.ry prepared by the

NP~"-.G,

Attached is a
together with an

index of the state decisions in support thereof (Appendix
A and B).
Courts in many jurisdictions have considered
the relation of the powers of the Attorney General
enumerated by statute to those existing under common law.
Most courts follow the rationale expressed by the New
York Court in People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396 (1868):
"As the powers of the Attorney
General were not c·onferred by statute,
a grant by statute of the same or other
powers, would not operate to deprive
him of those belonging to the office at
common law, unless the statute, either
expressly, or by reasonable intendment,
forbade the exercise of powers not thus
expressly conferred."
Florida's court in State ex rel. Landis v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 155 So. 823 (Fla. 1934), stated:
the duties of such a11
so nurn2r0Js and varied that
it has not been the policy of the
Legislatures of the states to
specifically enumerate them; that a
grant to the off ice of some powers
by statute does not deprive the Attorney
General of those belonging to the office
under the common law." Id. at 827.
o£fic~

a~e

-14-
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In State ex rel. Barrett v. Boeckeler Lumber
Co., 257

s.w.

453 (Mo. 1924), the Missouri Court concurred:
"A grant by statute of the same or
other powers does not operate to deprive
hin1 [the Attorney GeneL"al] of those
belonging to the officer under the
common law, unless the statute, either
expressly or by reasonable intendment,
forbids the exercise of powers not thus
expressly conferred.
(6 C.J. 816). This
view has been tacitly accepted, and
acted upon, in this state for many years."
Id. at 456.

Therefore, in states like Utah which hqve adopted
the common law, it is not necessary to enumerate the powers
of the Attorney General, but the additional grant of
specific, statutory responsibilities serves simply to
supplement the common law powers, unless the statutes
specifically divest the Attorney General thereof.
An integral part of the combined common law
and statutory powers of the Attorney General is the ability
to file an information and prosecute a public offense in
District Court.

People v. Karrella, supra; State v.

POINT II
BECAUSE THE STATE PROVED ALL OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT BY
DECEPTION, THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.

Appellant argues that his failure to object
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to the alleged defect in the information at or before
arraignment is rescued by the fact that jurisdictional
defects in the information are grounds for a Motion in
Arrest of Judgment and such issues can be raised at
any time.

Appellant contends that an information signed

by a person not authorized is jurisdictionally defective.
Thus, argues appellant, the supposed jurisdictional
defect can be raised at any time and is not waived by
failure to object before or at arraignment.
Respondent asserts that appellant should have
raised his objection at the proper time in order to
allow respondent to correct the supposed defect and that
his failure to object at or before arraignment or at
least at the earliest practical time, waived any
subsequent objection.
As previously outlined, Utah Code Ann.

§

67-5-1

(1953), as amended, gives the Attorney General "supervisory
powers" over "all matters pertaining to the duties" of the
county attorney.

Additionally, this statute

provid~3

t~at

the Attorney General may "assist any • • • county attorney
in the discharge of his duties" when requested by the
governor or when, in the judgment of the Attorney General,
the "public service" so demands.

In Sacramento County v.

Central Pacific Ry. Co., supra, it was determined that the
Attorney General could assume the "paramount control and
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direction" of a case he and a county attorney were
jointly prosecuting.
Taken together, all of these statutory and
caselaw pronouncements of the Attorney General's duties
and authority lead to the reasonable conclusion that,
at the very least, at certain times the Attorney General
has power to file an information and fully prosecute
any subsequent matters following therefrom.

The officer

who has the power to "supervise," or to assume a primary
role in joint business would also have the basic authority
and powers of the person supervised.

For example, under

the rubric of the National Labor Relations Act, although some
persons are designated as supervisors and given supervisory
duties, they still have the power and authority to perform
any of the tasks of the persons supervised.

N.L.R.B. v.

Ertel Mfg. Corp., 352 F.2d 916 (C.A. Ind., 1965); N.L.R.B.
v. Florida Agric. Supply Co., 328 F.2d 989 (C.A. Fla. 1964).
This conclusion finds further support by
considering the obvious legislative concern when giving
th2 Attorney General po•·1er to supervise, assist and/or

assume the primary role in a case jointly prosecuted with
a county attorney.
Pursuant to that legislative concern,
the Attorney General was given all of the powers of a county
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attorney to be exercised at various times, the most
obvious of which would include death, disability,
resignation or other absence of a county attorney,
conflict of interest of the county attorney in a particular
case, overwhelming caseload

at a particular time, requested

assistance, etc.
Likewise, the Governor is empowered by statute
to request the Attorney General to "assist any •
county attorney in the discharge of his duty."

If that

assistance required the preparing and signing of an
information by the Attorney General, it is logical to
assume that the Governor's request for aid presupposes
sufficient power

in

the Attorney General to prepare

and file an information.
Thus, from the statutory grants of power
previously examined it is reasonable to conclude that
at least at given times and in given circumstances the
Attorney General can prepare and sign an information.
A d.efendar.C: r:irosecutec1 unc1er such an information migLthen legitimately raise the question, "Was this an
appropriate case for the exercise of that power?"

This

question is not jurisdictional and is properly waived
unless raised by a timely motion to quash the information.
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Because this question is not jurisdictional, Utah
Code Ann.

§

77-23-5 (2)

(1953), specifically provides that

one ground for a motion to quash an information is:
That the prosecuting attorney
information."

h~d

"(c)

no authority to file the

Thus, defendant could and should have filed

a motion to quash the information clearly based on the
above stated grounds, but Utah Code Ann.

§

77-23-1 (1953),

requires the defendant to raise his motion to quash the
information before or at the time of arraignment on the
information or at least in a timely manner.

Otherwise,

the objection is waived.
"Upon being arraigned the defendant
shall immediately, unless the court grants
him further time, either move to quash the
information or indictment, or plead thereto,
or do both. If he moves to quash, without
also pleading, and the motion is withdrawn,
or overruled he shall immediately plead."
In the instant case the information charging
appellant was filed on August 4, 1977 (R.7), and the appellant
pled thereto on August 5, 1977 (R.8), but he did not file his
motion to quash the information until March 1, 1978 (R.29),
just five days before trial was scheduled to begin (R.18).
Defendant's motion was clearly untimely in light of the
Section 77-23-1 requirement that such a motion be raised only
before or at arraignment or at least in a timely manner (by
leave of the court) as was found by the lower court (R.47).
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When the defendant failed to raise his
objection to the information at the time of his
arraignment or as soon as practical thereafter with
leave of the court, he waived his right to subsequently
contest the validity of the information.
Ann.

§

77-21-5(2)

Utah Code

(1953), prohibits any "objection

to an information on the ground that it was not
subscribed or verified (as provided in Section
77-21-5(1)) • • • after moving to quash or pleading
to the merits."

(Emphasis added.)

Therefore, when

defendant pleaded to the information and made no
motion to quash such before or at the time of
his arraignment or as soon thereafter as practical,
he waived any right to object to the content,
authority or signing of the information.

This

conclusion was also reached by the lower court
(R. 4 7) •

-20-

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann.

§

77-16-2 (1953, as amended) provides:

"No defect or irregularity in or
want or absence of any proceeding or
statutory requirement, prior to the
filing of an information or indictment,
including the preliminary hearing,
shall constitute prejudicial error and
the defendant shall be conclusively presumed to have waived any such defect,
irregularity, want or absence of proceeding or statutory requirement, unless
he shall before pleading to the information or indictment specifically
and expressly object to the information
or indictment on such ground. Whenever
the consent of the state to any waiver
by the defendant is required, such
consent shall be conclusively presumed,
unless the state before or at the time
the defendant pleads to the information
or indictment expressly objects to such
waiver."
This statute contemplates the circumstances of this
case.

Even though Mr. Gaither did not represent appellant

at his arraignment, he actively represented appellant as early
as December 12, 1977.

He had ample time to challenge any

alleged defects in the information long before the March 6,
1978 trial date.

Even though appellant failed to challenge

the validity of the information, he does not argue that any
prejudice o= injustice resulted
firmities in the information.

~ecause

of the

all~ged

i~-

The State provided a bill of

particulars (R. 12-14, 32-34), it provided and discussed with
appellant's attorney all of the state witnesses,

(R. 30-31) and

it did not oppose appellant's motions to continue the trial
date.

No confusion or conflict existed about who was
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prosecuting the charged offense.

Appellant's waiver did not

result in hardship or unfairness, nor did it comproraise or
jeopardize any possible defenses.

Utah Code Ann.

§

77-23-10'
I

(1953, as amended) also provides that all objections which

I

would be grounds for a motion to quash, except those which
are grounds for a motion in arrest of judgment, are waived
unless timely raised.

Utah Code Ann.

§§

77-34-1 and 77-3S-ll

define grounds for a motion in arrest of judgment.

1

These

statutes include jurisdictional defects, but do not include
challenges to the appropriateness of a supervisory prosecutin
authority exercising that authority, as in the case here.
Under statutory provisions, appellant is presumed
to have conclusively waived any possible defects in the information and his challenge is without merit.
This same result has also been reached in several
other jurisdictions with similar statutory requirements as
to informations.
So. 2d 888

Gerlaugh v. Florida Parole Corrunission, 139

(Fla., 1962); State v. Amart, 328 S.W. 2d 569

(Mo., 1959); Arnold v. State, 233 Ark. 3, 342 S.W. 2d 291
(1960).

Flo~ida

supra, the defendant contended that a constitutional provision required the state's attorney to sign an information
and not an assistant state's attorney as had done so in the
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information charging defendant.

Defendant Gerlaugh did not

raise this objection until after he had pleaded to the information.

The Supreme Court of Florida, while noting

several cases where it had reversed a decision based on this
same contention, where such contention had been raised in a
timely fashion, refused to entertain defendant's objection
because he had not raised it before pleading to the infermation.

The Florida Court stated that granting the desired

relief to the defendant:
" • • • who has waived his right to object,
as pointed out in the previous cases, is
clearly unjustified. The quoted language
must be considered as holding only that
upon timely objections to an information
on the ground that it was not signed by the
State's Attorney such an information is
null, void and of no effect." 139 So. 2d at 890
The purpose behind this longstanding rule is clear.
When the defendant objects to the information before he pleads
thereto or as soon thereafter as practical, it gives the
court an opportunity to examine his objection to the information
before incurring the costs, in time and money, of going to
If
th~

t~e

cou=t

~inds

the objection to be without merit,

defendant must then proceed to trial and

on those proceedings.

focus his efforts

At that point, further contentions as

to the information cannot be raised in order to allow the
court to handle trial proceedings without distraction.
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\~here

the court finds defendant's objections to

the information to be meritorious, it must allow the state
to correct the errors if possible, or, where the errors
cannot be corrected, quash the information.

U.C.A.

§

77-17-Ji

of court, in any matter of form or substance at any time
before the defendant pleads thereto."

Specifically where

an information has not been properly verified according to
section 77-21-5, section 77-23-3 (2) (b) allows the prosecutinj
attorney to correct the verification at the hearing on the
motion.

If the prosecuting attorney does such, the motion

to quash will be overruled.
application

This requirement has special

in the instant matter because an assistant

Attorney was present at each stage of the proceedings

Cou~

(as

illustrated by selected minute entries - R. 15, 17), and
could have properly verified the information had he been
requested.

But because defendant failed to timely motion th<

court to quash the information and challenge the signing of
the information by an assistant attorney general, the State

fective information as allowed in sections 77-17-3 anj
77-23-5 (2) (b).

Thus, defendant's failure to challenge the

information in a timely fashion not only waived his right to
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challenge it at a subsequent date, but also prejudiced the
respondent's ability to

a~cnd

the information by correcting

the supposed deficiency.
Thus, respondent asserts that the lower court
properly determined that defendant's motion was not filed in
a timely manner.

Moreover, because defendant failed to timely

object, he waived his right to challenge the alleged error
in the information and robbed respondent of his opportunity
to amend the information by correcting the alleged defect.
Respondent further notes that if this Court accepts
defendant's contentions that the Attorney General cannot
sign an information, that his signing of the instant information was a jurisdictional defect and therefore reversed
defendant's conviction, jeopardy would not attach and defendant could be prosecuted a second time under a valid
information.
(1945).

State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P. 2d 741

Such a decision would mean not only that all the

time defendant has served on his first conviction would be
considered dead time, but that the State would be put to the
Resp011.~l'.=:n.t

asserts that it is contrary to public policy to force the
state to assume the burden of a new trial in the instant
matter on the basis of an alleged defect in the information.
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POINT III
BECAUSE THE STATE PROVED ALL OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT BY
DECEPTION, THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
Defendant argu2s that Alpha Distributing did not
suffer actual loss and got merely what it bargained for in
association with the defendant.

Believing that there was

actual loss by Alpha Distributing, defendant reasons that
an

element of the crime of theft by deception as described

in U.C.A. § 76-6-405 (1973) was not established and that his
motion to dismiss should have been granted.
Respondent asserts that every element of the crime
of theft by deception was established at defendant's jury

tr~

and, therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion to dismiss.
Defendant was charged with and convicted of theft
by deception as described in U.C.A. § 76-6-405 (1973):
"A person commits theft if he
obtains or exercises control over
property of another by deception and
with a purpose to deprive him thereof."

a prosecution for theft by deception are found in Utah Code
Annotated, §76-6-401:
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" (l)
'Property' means anything of
value, including real estate, tangible
and intangible personal property, captured
or domestic animals and birds, written
instruments or other writings representing
or embodying rights concerning real or
personal property, labor, services, or
otherwise containing anything of value to
t':1e 01.1:-i.e:c, co:-n.rnodit:.ie.::; of a. -~·-1blic L:t.ility
nature such as telecommunications, gas,
electricity, steam, or water, and trade
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion
of any scientific or technical information,
design, process, procedure, formula, or
invention which the owner thereof intends
to be available only to persons selected by
him.

(2)
'Obtain' means, in relation to
property, to bring about a transfer of ,
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, whether
to the obtainer or another; in relation to
labor or services, to secure performance
thereof; and in relation to a trade secret,
to make any facsimile, replica, photograph,
or other reproduction.
(31
'Purpose to deprive' means to
have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property
permanently or for so extended
a period or to use under such
circumstances that a substantial
portion of its economic value, or
of the use and benefit thereof,
would be lost; or
(b)
To restore the property
oPl'.r 11po::_ ~a._;~,,.ent o~ a rei:Tard or
o-:h..::

corr::;2ns(J_ tio_:; or
(c)
To dis2ose of

the ,-,,roperty
under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover
it.
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(4)
'Obtri.in or exercise unauthorized
control' means, but is not necessarilv
limited to, conduct heretofore deEine~
or known as cornr1on-law larceny b~' trespassory
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny bv
bailee, and embezzlement.
( 5)
irlt,~ntion?-i

'Deception' occurs when a person
lly:

(a)

Creates or confirms

by words or conduct an impression

of law or fact that is false and
that the actor does not believe
to be true and that is likely to
affect the judgment of another
in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a
false impression of law or fact
that is likely to affect th-e~
judgment of another and that the
actor does not now believe to be
true; or
(c)
Prevents another from
acquiring information likely to
affect his judgment in the transaction; or
(d)
Sells or otherwise
transfers or encumbers property
without disclosing a lien, security
interest, adverse claim, or other
legal impediment to the enjoyment
of the property, whether the lien,
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is
not a matter of official record; or
(e)
Promises performance that
is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction, which
performa~ :8

~!1e

actor Joes not in-

or ~ncw3 ~ill not be
p3rEor~e2; pro\rided, ~owev?~, th~t
failure to perform the promise in
issue without other evidence of
intent or knowledge is not sufficient
proof that the actor did not intend
to perform or knew the promise would
not be performed."
(Emphasis added.)
t~~~

to ·

~rforn

-28-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In addition to the above elements, the Utah Court
has required that the victim sustain a "pecuniary or property
loss by reason of the transaction relied upon."
RS

Tltah 210, 38 P. 2d 1097, 1100 (1934).

State v. Morris,

But to this

reauirement the following caveat exists:
. the actual fraud and
prejudice .
. is determined according
to the situation of the victim immediately
after he parts with his property.
If he
gets what was pretended and what he bargained
for, there is no fraud or prejudice."
38 P.
2d at 1099.
See also State v. Fisher, 70 Utah 115, 8 P. 2d 589 at 590 (1932).
In the instant case, the State established each and
every element of the crime of theft by deception.

The de-

fendant claimed to be the owner of numerous business enterprises including Continental Bank and Trust Co., Zero Cold
Corporation, Harbor Rest Memorial Park, 1n1ite Berns Golf
Course, and the Capitol Heights project.

(T. 18-20). Additionally,

defendant told Mr. Escabar, as Alpha's representative, that
certain stock he would be given was trading at $5.00 per share.
(T. 18).
32J

Defendant further represented that he would put

~~~~io~

~~ll0~s

i~to

t~2

Uta~

Pi0n~ers

Soccer Team (T.

211)

and that he would provide total financial tacking and operating
capital for the team.

(T. 38).

-29-
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At trial eacl1 of these representations

1·?i1S

proven

to be false and that defendant made these re?resentations
knowing them to be such.

(T.

112, 192, 198, 202,

216).

Each of these representations was made with the

This element was established by the fact that the defendant

I'

required Alpha Distributing to "become a part of Frontier U.S.
stating that Frontier "needed assets",

(T. 32), that the
I

defendant provided no money for team expenses after the
initial funding (T. 69, 74), and that defendant instructed
Mr. Escabar to pay team expenses out of Alpha Distributing
accounts with the promise that he would reimburse Alpha, but
(T. 47, 48, 69, 74),

such reimbursement was not forthcominq.

I

At trial, the State clearly established that defendant wanted
the soccer team solely for publicity purposes (T. 19, 252),

hoping that such exposure would benefit his loan fee operatior
Actual fraud resulted when Alpha Distributing paid
substantially all of the expenses of the Utah Pioneers, expenses which the defendant had promised to pay,.and the de-

-television expo3u:::e t.1:ccuyh his ·"3.lleged

team.

11

0\,;ne:cship

1
'

of the

It is clear that obtaining a benefit, such as ad-

I

vertising, through fraud and deceit will sufficiently establ0

1
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one cf the elements of theft by deception.
Okl. Cr., 336 P. 2d 425 (1961).

Stokes v. State,,

See also Beasley v. People,

168 Colo. 286, 450 P. 2d 658 (1969).
Finally, Mr. Escabar repeatedly testified that he
entered into the soccer agreement

with the defendant on

behalf of Alpha because of the defendant's representations of
financial success and security

(T. 23, 39).

All of these facts, taken together, amount to the
theft of Alpha's property by deception as defined by U.C.A.
§

76-6-401(5) (e)

(1973) quoted above.

Thus, the State having established all the elements
of theft by deception, there was no basis for the trial court
to grant defendant's motion to dismiss and such was properly
denied.
CONCLUSION
The Attorney General had authority to file the
information in this case.

The lower court correctly ruled

that appellant had waived any objection to possible defects
in the

info~mation

because any such defects

wer~

not juris-

the state sufficiently proved all the elements of the crime
charged.
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Appellant was prosecuted by a proper authority
and his conviction should be affirmed.

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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